Pricing behavior and the introduction of the euro: evidence from a panel of restaurants by Eugenio Gaiotti & Francesco Lippi
PRICING BEHAVIOR AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO: EVIDENCE 
FROM A PANEL OF RESTAURANTS 
 
Eugenio Gaiotti and Francesco Lippi
* 
This draft:  February 2005 
 
Abstract 
This paper assembles an original panel of data from 2,500 restaurants in Italy over 
1998-2004, with the objective of studying whether the euro cash changeover had an impact 
on individual pricing behavior, as apparently perceived by consumers, and which economic 
mechanisms may explain it.  
 On the first point, the data show that only about a price increase of 3-4 percentage 
points can be attributed to the new currency; the changeover focussed the public attention 
over a medium-run trend, prompting the attribution of the whole increase to the introduction 
of the euro.  
 On the second point, we reach two conclusions. We find evidence consistent with the 
existence of “menu-costs”: during the changeover the rise in the average meal price is 
mainly due to a larger fraction of agents who simultaneously revise their price. We also find 
that during the changeover more market power (proxied by a index of concentration on local 
markets) was associated with larger price increases; we propose a simple interpretation based 
on consumer behavior which may also explain why the effects of the cash changeover were 
especially pronounced in this industry as opposed to more competitive ones. 
 
JEL: D40 
Keywords: euro changeover, menu costs.  
1.  Introduction 
The introduction of the euro banknotes and coins (cash changeover), which occurred 
during the early months of 2002, was followed by a heated debate on the alleged inflationary 
effect that such a renomination of the unit of account supposedly exerted on the price level in 
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several Euro-area countries, as well as on the reasons underlying such an effect.
1 Since 2002, 
the dynamics of consumers’ “perceived inflation” (based on qualitative judgements) was 
systematically greater than that of actual inflation; in Italy, such a phenomenon was more 
marked than in other countries (Figure 1).  
The Italian media and consumers’ associations frequently reported about extraordinary 
price increases. Among those, the ones recorded by restaurants gave rise to great 
controversies. According to a survey conducted in an Italian region, one third of citizens 
blamed restaurants for excessive increases, a percentage second only to the share of 
respondents who blamed food prices.
2 Various newspaper articles reported anecdotal 
evidence allegedly showing that the cost a meal in a restaurant or a pizzeria had increased by 
80-100% after the introduction of the euro.
3 It became almost common wisdom to argue that 
price setters took advantage of the psychological conversion of 1,000 lire into 1 euro, which 
would basically amount to a doubling of the price:
4 "everybody knows that one euro is now 
worth 1,000, not 2,000, lire",
5 an opinion sometimes also put forward by members of the 
administration.  
After the introduction of the euro, in Italy and in most euro area countries, restaurant 
prices were indeed among the fastest growing items in the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP); however, the size of the increase is in contrast with the perceptions voiced in 
the public discussions. Inflation in the "restaurant and cafe's" sector showed a blip in January 
2002 (a month-on-month increase of 0.8 percent) and reached a 12-month growth rate of 5 
percent at the end of the same year, compared to previous figures ranging between 2 and 3 
percent (Figure 2). 
Such facts raise two distinct questions. First, it is of interest to understand what 
happened at a more disaggregated level, which may shed light on why consumers’ 
perceptions about inflation diverged so markedly from the official measures. Preliminary 
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investigations into this problem have conjectured that consumers’ inflation expectations may 
have been particularly affected by rise in the price of frequently purchased goods, and/or by 
the detection of a greater-than-usual fraction of rising prices, whose impact on the general 
price level would however be limited.
6  
The second question concerns the identification of the economic mechanism which 
may have favored increases of some prices in the face of an event, such as the change in the 
unit of account, which was widely expected to be “neutral”. Two candidate explanations 
have been advanced so far. The first one emphasizes the presence of collusion and/or lack of 
competition. This is the prevailing interpretation in the popular debate and in the press; for 
restaurant prices, a more formal version of this view, based on collusive behavior and 
multiple equilibria is advanced by Adriani et al. (2003).  The second set of explanations 
stresses the existence of sticky prices and small menu costs: the changeover is viewed as 
inducing more firms than usual to review their prices simultaneously, which may have short-
run inflationary consequences. Hobjin et al. (2004) propose a model along these lines and 
use it to study the dynamics of restaurant prices after the changeover, based on HICP figures. 
Our strategy is to address these issues by making extensive recourse to micro-data. We 
begin by assembling an original panel of data from 2,500 restaurants,  pizzerie and the like in 
Italy over 1998-2004 using data from a leading guide to Italian restaurants. The sample 
includes well-known establishments and is not designed to be representative of the whole 
sector. Our interest stems from the possibility of gaining deeper insights from the individual 
data. In particular, the individual data allow us to study whether there are features of the 
distribution of individual price changes in the year 2002 (e. g. the frequency of price 
revisions or the number of 'exceptionally' large increases) which may contribute to explain 
the widespread perception of a large effect of the introduction of the euro on prices.
7  
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The descriptive evidence drawn from these data opens the way to the analysis of the 
two above-mentioned mechanisms capable of explaining a changeover-related increase in 
prices. First, we study whether the observed price setting behavior provides any support to 
the “menu cost” hypothesis, which suggests that the year 2002 is a special one as the change 
in the unit of account invites all agents to revise their prices. We analyze the distribution of 
individual price increases, asking whether the average price increase and the frequency of 
price revisions in the year of the cash changeover were larger than “normal”. 
Next, we analyze whether the price increases recorded during the changeover relate to 
the local degree of competition, on the basis of a pricing equation that controls for several 
determinants of restaurant prices. We argue that if the changeover made prices less 
transparent to consumers, producers might have exploited such confusion to raise prices, at 
least temporarily. Such an incentive is greater the less elastic the demand faced by the 
consumer, as this ensures the producer a smaller fall in sales in case the consumer realizes 
the true value of the new price.  
Both exercises provide a first quantification of the magnitude of, respectively, the 
“menu-cost” and the “market power” channel. The analysis is completed by the presentation 
of a formal model in which both effects appear simultaneously. The model is calibrated on 
historical data and then used to simulate the effect of the changeover on prices.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the database: an open 
panel of about 2500 establishments (including restaurants, “pizzerie” and “trattorie”) for the 
years 1998-2004, a total of about 17.000 observations which were purposely assembled for 
this paper. The main facts affecting demand and costs in this industry over the period and the 
key descriptive statistics on the distribution of individual price changes are presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 discusses the frequency and size of price revisions, a decomposition 
which is helpful in identifying the source of the price increase and the relevance of the 
“menu cost” assumption. An econometric analysis of the role of “market power” in the 
setting of prices is in Section 5. Section 6 formally analyzes the role of the “menu cost” and 
the “market power” hypotheses by means of a simple price setting model, attempting to 
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quantify the relative importance of these two channels. A concluding section summarizes the 
main findings.  
2. A description of the database 
Restaurant prices are collected from the yearly publications Guida dei ristoranti 
d'Italia and Roma; both are leading guides to Italian restaurants, wine-bars, trattorie and 
pizzerie.
8 
The data report the price of a “full meal”.
9 The price records are expressed in lire until 
2001 (rounded to the nearest 5,000 lire, approximately 2.6 euro), in euro since 2002 
(rounded to the nearest euro). For the sole “restaurant” category, the guide also assigns a 
score, on a 0-100 scale, concerning its quality; it includes information about each 
establishment, such as location or category. Data are annual, collected each year during the 
first semester; the guide is published towards the end of September. The data span the 1998-
2004 period. 
The panel is unbalanced, since the list of surveyed establishments is revised each year. 
On average, 85 per cent of the establishments surveyed in a given year also appear in the 
guide the following year. This subset allows us to compute price increases. We converted the 
lira prices in euro, rounding them to the nearest euro. In order to avoid the results to be 
affected by the rounding conventions used by the guide in each year, in computing price 
increases we set to zero all price changes smaller than 1 euro in absolute value.
10   
Tables A1-A5 in appendix A provide a detailed description of the sample composition. 
The number of establishments surveyed in each year hovers between 1,800 and 2,500 
observations, for a total of 17,000 observations (Table A1). Due to sample turnover, the 
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number of price changes computed in each year is smaller, between 1,600 and 2,300 per 
year, for a total of 12,300 observations.  
The data cover the entire national territory. The distribution by geographical area 
(Table A2) reveals a slight under-representation of the establishments located in the South 
(23 per cent of the total, which compares with a 32 per cent computed from the registry of 
the Chamber of Commerce).
11  
As to the type of establishments, the majority is represented by restaurants (about 70 
per cent; see Table A3); the remaining part consists of trattorie, pizzerie and wine bars. 
Overall, the surveyed establishments cover approximately 3.5 per cent of the total number of 
businesses recorded by the Chamber of Commerce (Table A4).  
Assuming that the surveyed establishments are scarcely substitutable with lower-
quality and less visible dining places, we constructed an indicator of the degree of market 
competition at the local (province) level. A first measure is given by the ratio between the 
number of quality dining places that are present in a given province, proxied by the number 
of establishments reported in the guide, and resident population. This indicator, whose 
averages are reported in the first column of Table A5 for the Italian Regioni,
12 suggests a 
greater degree of competition in the North-east regions, a smaller one in the South. By 
overlooking the presence of tourists, however, the indicator might overestimate competition 
in the provinces where tourism is highly relevant. To this end, a second measure is 
constructed as the ratio between the number of quality dining places and a weighted sum of 
local population and foreign and domestic tourist presence.
13 The indicator, reported in the 
second column of Table A5, broadly confirms the previous picture, with the notable 
exception of a few small regions which attract considerable tourism flows.    
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Our sample was obviously not designed with the aim of being representative of the 
whole restoration industry and should not be considered as such. As discussed in the next 
section, the rise in the price index in the whole sector is smaller than in our high-quality 
establishments. One possible explanation for the divergence is due to the fact that these 
belong to a segment facing a less elastic demand (the implications of this hypothesis is 
discussed in detail in Sections 5 and 6). More generally, the demand for quality food 
increased significantly in Italy in the last few years, as witnessed by the growing diffusion of 
publications and guides on the subject, possibly commanding an increasing premium on 
quality restaurants. 
Table A6 reports several descriptive statistics on the price of a meal from 1998 to 
2004, sorted by year and establishment type. The average price of a meal in a restaurant 
varies from 33 euro in 1998 to 49 euro in 2004; in wine bars, pizzerie  and  trattorie  it 
increases from 20 to 27 euro. The price dispersion (standard deviation) increases in time.  
3. Demand and costs conditions and the dynamics of meal prices over 1999-2004  
In the period under examination, both demand and supply conditions in the industry 
were subject to shocks that should be considered when examining the data. Between the 
second half of 2000 and the first half of 2001, a strong rise in the demand for meal services 
took place, related to the spike of tourism sparked by the Jubilaeum of the Catholic church in 
the year 2000. Expenses by foreign tourists (Figure 3) then decreased sharply following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
14 The growth of households’ expenditure (at 
constant prices) in the "restaurant and hotel services" sector also reached a peak in 2000; 
employment and value added in this industry grew at around 8 per cent.  
On the costs side, substantial increases in the price of unprocessed food took place in 
2001-2003, due to exceptional events, as the spreading of first BSE ("mad cow") and then 
foot-and-mouth diseases in 2000-2001, or adverse climatic conditions at the beginning of 
2002. According to Eurostat data (Figure 4), the agricultural production prices increased 
rapidly in 2001, at a rate above 5 percent; they slowed down, but still kept increasing, in the 
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following years. Fresh food consumer prices followed a similar, although more persistent, 
pattern; in this case, growth was above 4 percent until 2003. Unit labour costs in the “hotels 
and restaurants” sector increased substantially in 2001 and, notably, 2002 and 2003. All in 
all, the annual growth in costs can be roughly estimated to have been between 4 and 6 
percent in  2001-2003.    
The main statistics on price increases in our sample are reported in Table 1. Two facts 
emerge from the data: in the year of the euro changeover the average increase is sizable (9.3 
per cent), but it  does not represent a peak (which is located in the year 2001, at 10,5 per 
cent). This holds irrespective of the type of establishments under investigation (Table A7 in 
Appendix A). A sample split by geographical areas (North, center and South) shows that the 
year of the changeover records a peak increase in prices only in the South (Table A8).  
A similar picture emerges from other descriptive statistics, such as the median, or an 
indicator of the largest increases (the 95
th percentile or the maximum increase). In all these 
cases, the increases recorded in 2002 and 2003 are smaller than in the previous year. The 
year of the changeover is characterized by price increases that, although sizable, are not out 
of line with those recorded in previous years.   
Table 1: The rise in the price of a meal (12-month growth) 












Sample  average 4.3 6.7  10.5  9.3 5.8 3.8 
5
th  percentile  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Median  0.0 0.0  10.0  8.7 4.9 0.0 
95
th  percentile  25.0 30.0 33.3 29.0 20.0 20.0 
Standard  deviation  10.4 12.3 12.5 11.3  8.6  9.2 
 
A comparison of the average annual price increase in our dataset with those from 
other studies is shown in Table A9. Our data are basically identical to those obtained from a 
similar sample of quality restaurants by Adriani et al. (2003), although their sole observation 
concerns 2003. In contrast, notable differences emerge between our data and the increase of 
the average price level for the whole sector produced by the National statical offices.    8
Although the time profile of the changes is similar, the rise in the price index in the whole 
sector is much smaller than in our high-quality establishments. This holds for all years and it 
is not limited to 2002.  
According to the facts presented above, price increases in 2000 and 2001 may be 
related to increases in demand and costs, which are likely to have affected prices with a lag. 
Such a lag may just reflect  the way our data are constructed: the prices reported in the Guide 
are surveyed in the first half of the year.  
The trends recorded in the city of Rome, most directly connected to the Jubilaeum, 
confirm the conjecture that tourism played a role in the evolution of prices. In Rome (Table 
2) the largest increase occurred in the year 2000 (about 12,7 per cent); in that year, the 
average price growth in the establishments located in the Vatican area and the close-by 
tourist district of Trastevere are, respectively, of 23 and 29 per cent, much greater than in the 
rest of the city.  
 
Table 2: The rise in the price of a meal - selected Rome districts (12-month growth) 











Average  6,1 12,7  10,7 8,6  3,8  3,8 
City  Center  5,4 12,0  12,9 7,1  4,8  3,8 
Vatican  10,6  23,4  8,9 3,0 0,0 5,1 
Trastevere    6,4 29,3  11,6 1,3  4,8  2,1 
 
Considering the tails of the distribution, there is simply no evidence of any doubling of 
prices in 2002. Table 3 shows the number of price increases larger than a given threshold 
(respectively, 50,  75 or  90 per cent) in each year. As in the previous case, the years 2002 
and 2003 stand out for the smaller number (virtually nil) of “large” increases. A few 
increases greater than 50 percent can be found in 2000-2002, but not later. The conjecture 
that high perceived inflation was caused by large increases which hit the imagination of the 
consumers finds little support in the data (such increases represent less than 2 per cent of the 
total sample observations).    9
Table 3: Number of "extreme" price increases  












Increases greater than 50%  11 20 30 17  5  6 
Increases greater than 75%  4 4 4 4 0 0 
Increases greater than 90%  2 1 2 1 0 0 
Total # observations  2239 2292 2144 2023 2028 1552 
 
A major factor affecting the public perception, however, may have been the substantial 
cumulate price increase which took place over the whole 1998-2002: around 40 per cent on 
average, or even 75 per cent for the 10 per cent of establishments which recorded the largest 
price rises. These observations help to form a conjecture on the factors that may have 
favored the “perception” of an exceptional rise in prices among consumers; such an increase, 
while it actually took place, occurred more gradually during the years than perceived. 
4. The frequency of price revisions 
The histograms in Figure 5 show the distribution of price changes in each year. The 
distributions are strongly asymmetric, with few negative records. The mode is at zero. This 
indicates that in most years a large mass of firms leave their price unchanged, or change it by 
a small amount. In the years 1999, 2000 and 2004 this mass amounts to about 60 per cent of 
the whole population (Table 4); on average, the percentage is around 40 per cent. These data 
correspond to an average duration of prices of respectively 23 and 13 months
15. In both 2001 
and 2002 the percentage of unchanged prices is much smaller, reducing to below 30 percent. 
16 
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by assuming continuous decisions and applying the formula reported by Bils e Klenow (2002), [-1/log(1-
a)]*12. According to Bils e Klenow, the average price duration for items "lunch" or "dinner" is 11 months.  
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comparable through time: before 2002, any price change smaller than one euro in absolute value would not 
have been recorded by the Guide due to the rounding convention described in Section 2. Second, in 2002  many 
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The data are consistent with the “menu cost” hypothesis: small price revisions are 
prevented, in normal years, by an adjustment cost.
17 From this standpoint, the changeover, 
and the associated renomination of all prices in the new unit of account, can be though of as 
an aggregate shock which requires each agent to repost its price, creating an opportunity to 
revise it, consequently determining an increase in average inflation.
18  
Table 4: Number of constant and falling prices  
Year  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
a) # unchanged prices   1432  1309  600  542  861  874 
b) # price reductions   108  72  74  90  45  109 
c)  #  observations  2239 2292 2144 2023 2028 1552 
a/c  0.64 0.57 0.28 0.27 0.42 0.56 
 
The size of the average (as well as median) price revision (Table  5) reinforces the 
impression that pricing polices in years 2002 and 2003, rather than representing a 
discontinuity, were quite moderate in relative terms. Average increases were among the 
smallest since 1999 (13 and 10 per cent, respectively,  versus 15 and 16 per cent in the 




                                                                                                                                                                                   
"small" variations in prices (equal to 1 euro) would be observed, even if prices were unchanged. This is due to 
the new rounding convention adopted by the Guide since 2002. For example, in 2001 a "true" price of 17,500 
lire would have been rounded to 20,000 lire, corresponding to 10 euro; in 2002 the same price would be 
rounded to 9 euro. Had we not made these adjustments, the figures in the fourth row of Table 4, would have 
been equal to 5%, 30% and 50% in 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively (there would have been no change in 
1999-2001).   
17 Fabiani, Gattulli e Sabbatini (2003) study a sample of Italian firms and find that in the services sector the 
main reason given by the firms for not adjusting their price is fear of competitors not following. In this sector, 
according to their study, about 30% of firms kept prices unchanged in 2002.  
18 The fact that, according to mainstream "menu costs" models, at the moment of the changeover the 
revision of most prices should produce a blip in inflation is discussed in section 6. Also see Hobjin et al. 
(2004).     11
Table 5: Distribution of price revisions, unchanged prices excluded (12-month growth) 












Sample  average  12.0 15.7 14.6 12.7 10.1  8.7 
5
th  percentile  -12.5  -8.3 3.7 -3.8 3.1  -12.4 
Median  11.1 13.3 12.5 11.1  8.3  8.3 
95
th  percentile  33.3 42.8 36.3 32.2 25.0 27.3 
Standard  deviation  14.5 14.5 12.6 11.5  9.2  12.4 
 
Altogether, it may be conjectured that the dynamics of prices reflects several shocks: 
an increase in demand and costs affecting both 2000 and 2001; and a "mandatory" rewriting 
of menus in 2002, coinciding with the cash changeover, which prompted most agents to post 
new prices.  
To compare the features of the pricing policies during these two episodes, we 
decomposed the average price change as follows: we first computed the differential between 
the average price change in each year (i) and in a base period (j), and then decomposed it 
into two contributions: the change in the share of prices which were reset (α) and the change 


























α α π π  
A model of infrequent state-dependent price revisions has implications for the 
decomposition (1). Assuming that the main effect of the introduction of the euro is the 
simultaneous revision of all menus, the first component in (1) should explain most of the 
change in inflation; in contrast, in case of a shock to demand, costs or profit margins both 
components in (1) should contribute to the increase in inflation
20.  
                                                           
19 Τhe first term is weighted with the average increase in prices, the second with the average share α. Eq. 
(1) is obtained by manipulating the identity: πi=αi ϕi,, where πi is the average price increase, αi is the share of 
price revisions in year i and ϕ i is the average increase of those prices that are revised. 
20 See section 6 below.    12
The results are reported in Table 6. The year 1999 is used as the benchmark period j.  










Price increase: differential with respect to 1999  2.4  6.2  5.0  1.5  -0.5 
i) due to larger share of price revisions  1.0  4.8  4.6  2.4  0.8 
ii) due to larger average increase of revised prices   1.4  1.4  0.4  -0.9  -1.3 
 
In 2001, the acceleration of prices with respect to the benchmark year (more than 6 
percentage points) is due to both factors: almost five percentage points are due to a larger 
number of firms who revised their prices; about 1.5 percentage points are due to larger 
increases made by those restaurants which changed their price. This evidence is consistent 
with a demand and costs shock, which may have prompted more agents than usual to revise 
their price, while also increasing them substantially (e. g., because marginal costs increased 
more rapidly). 
In 2002, the share of unchanged prices is also particularly low. However, the 
considerable number of price revisions determines 4.6 percentage points of higher inflation, 
the bulk of the overall increase. Unlike 2001, the effect of the size of the individual revisions 
on inflation is negligible (0.4 per cent).  
This evidence is consistent with the conjecture that in 2002 a price shock was due to a 
"mandatory" price revision, due to the cash changeover. Many prices changed, but the 
amount of individual increases was not particularly large. This followed two years of already 
sustained price growth, related to exogenous demand and cost factors. Perceptions of a large 
price increase may have been the cumulated effect of all these events 
5. Market structure and the effect of the changeover  
The previous section suggests that the "revision of the menus" was the main facrtor 
explaining the impact of the euro on prices. Still, market structure could also have 
contributed to the decision about how much to revise prices in the face of the changeover. A    13
possible explanation of such an effect is articulated in section 6 below: in industries 
characterized by low competition, producers may, at least temporarily, take advantage of the 
consumers' confusion to raise their price. Such an incentive is greater the less elastic the 
demand faced by the consumer, as this ensures the producer a smaller fall in sales in case the 
consumer realizes the true value of the new price. An implication of this conjecture is that 
only in year 2002 - and possibly in 2003, since increases taking place in the second half of 
2002 are recorded in the following year's data - the magnitude of price increases should be 
negatively correlated to the degree of local market competition, proxied by the indicator 
discussed in section 2 (and shown in table A 5). 
Some descriptive evidence, consistent with this conjecture, is presented in Table 7. 
Firms operating in more competitive local markets recorded a smaller increase in prices in 
2002, and vice-versa. The table compares the average price increase with those of the upper 
and lower tails of the distribution, ordered according to the competition indicator; the second 
measure discussed in section 2 is employed. The difference is notable: about two and a half 
percentage points between the top and the bottom fourth of firms. 
  























Mean  9.7 9.8 9.3 8.8 7.3 
5
th  percentile 0.0  0.0  0.0  -3.2 -13.0 
Median  8.7 8.7 8.7 7.7 7.4 
95
th  percentile  29.0 29.6 29.0 28.6 28.2 
 
 To address the issue more formally, we estimate a model of the determination of price 
changes over the period 1999-2003. Since price increases are truncated at zero (with a 
negligible number of exceptions), we model the price change as a case of censored data. To 
control for selectivity bias, we implement the estimates with the maximum likelihood    14
equivalent of Heckman's two step selection model.
21 The main results are quite robust to the 
use of alternative estimation methods, as Tobit, OLS, random effects or fixed effect 
estimators. 
We estimate the equation: 
(2)  i i i p ε + = ∆ β X  
where pi is the individual price of firm i and Xi is the vector of explanatory variables.
22  
Among the variables in Xi (affecting both the likelihood to change the price and the 
size of the price increase) we include the lagged log-price level of the firm (pt-1); a dummy 
taking value one for restaurants, zero otherwise (D
rist); and, for those establishments 
classified as restaurants, their lagged quality judgement (i.e. the score),
23 and the (lagged) 
"age" of the price (age), expressed as the number of years since the last price revision. We 
assume that the actual price revision is an increasing function of the distance of the lagged 
price from its equilibrium level, a function of the score variable. The (lagged) "age" of the 
price captures a similar effect: under positive inflation the time elapsed since the last change 
increases the probability that the price is revised again, and increases the expected size of the 
revision. 
As a proxy for cyclical demand pressure, we include the annual inflows of foreign 
tourists in each province, normalised by the population in the province (tourism). As for 
domestic demand, we include the (lagged) per capita value added in each province (vadd). 
Lacking other measures of real expenditure by households which have sufficient cross-
sectional variability, any remaining demand effect is captured by the time dummies included 
in the regression. The same applies to cost variables (like fresh food prices) who are not 
available at the disaggregate level. 
Among the explanatory variables we include our measure of local market competition 
                                                           
21 See Johnston and DiNardo (1997), ch.13.  
22 We assume that the same explanatory variables enter in the "selection" equation underlying Heckman 
estimates. 
23 Since the score variable is only available for restaurants, the variable is interacted with dummy D
rist in the 
regression.    15
(comp) defined in Section 2, based on the ratio of the number of restaurants in the guide to a 
weighted sum of local population and tourist presence,  interacted with the time dummies 
(T1999 to T2003). Our conjecture is that the degree of competition affects price dynamics only 
after the changeover; hence, the variable is entered separately for each year. 
The estimation results are reported in the first column of Table 8. Most variables are 
strongly significant and have the expected sign. In 2002 and in 2003, the degree of local 
market competition significantly enters the equation for price determination. In contrast, it 
does not significantly enter the model in the previous years.  
 
Table 8- Determinants of price changes 
 (Heckman selection model) 
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z|
p(t-1) -0.13 0.00 (°°) -0.13 0.00 (°°)
score*D rest 0.44 0.00 (°°) 0.44 0.00 (°°)
Drest -1.81 0.00 (°°) -1.81 0.00 (°°)
age 0.01 0.00 (°°) 0.01 0.00 (°°)
tourism 0.00 0.05 (°°) 0.00 0.05 (°°)
v.add. 0.04 0.00 (°°) 0.04 0.00 (°°)
comp*T1999 -0.30 0.14 -0.30 0.14
comp*T2000 -0.06 0.77 -0.06 0.78
comp*T2001 -0.29 0.08 -0.29 0.08
comp*T2002 -0.76 0.00 (°°) -0.76 0.00 (°°)
comp*T2003 -0.91 0.00 (°°) -0.90 0.00 (°°)
T2000 0.04 0.00 (°°) 0.04 0.00 (°°)
T2001 0.09 0.00 (°°) 0.06 0.00 (°°)
T2002 0.08 0.00 (°°) 0.04 0.00 (°°)
T2003 0.04 0.00 (°°) 0.01 0.15
∆ Input cost 1.00 restr.
Observations 10525 10525
Censored 4689 4689
Heckman selection model. Intercept (not shown) included. (°°) indicates 1% rejection confidence level.  
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Market structure thus seems to have contributed to the impact of the changeover, 
therefore giving a possible rationale for its non-neutrality. The size of the effect is relevant: 
differences in market concentration can be shown to explain a few points' differences in the 
price increases across provinces. Considering that in the equation for ∆pt the estimated 
coefficient on comp (when interacted with either T2002 or T2003) is around -0.8, a decrease in 
comp (i.e., less competition in the local market) equal to its standard deviation (which is 
0.03) would determine a price increase of about 2.5 percentage points.  
The coefficients of the time dummies T2000-T2003 provide us with an estimate of the 
time effects. In each year there is an “unexplained” increase relative to the 1999 benchmark, 
which captures the effect of price determinants not included in our regression, e.g. input 
costs. An attempt to control for the latter is presented in the second column of Table 8, 
where a proxy for the growth rate of input costs is added to the price equation (with a 
coefficient restricted to one). Once the model dynamics are accounted for,
24 the 
“unexplained” growth in prices in the year 2000 and 2001 is, respectively, 4 and 6 
percentage points. In the year of the changeover “unexplained” inflation is still positve but 
smaller, around 3 percentage points; it is slightly negative in 2003.  
6. The euro, competition and sticky prices: a simple model 
This section proposes an analytical framework to provide a rigorous formulation of the 
“menu cost” and the “market power” hypotheses and to quantify the effect implied by each 
one, thus providing an assessment of their relevance.  
We begin by showing how the cash changeover may cause a larger price increase 
where the market is less competitive. Next, we show how this effect may interact with the 
presence of menu costs and the consequent clustering of adjustments at the moment of 
introduction of the euro. We use the model presented above to fit some characteristics of the 
micro data before the changeover and to study the implications of the changeover under 
                                                           
24 Defining the time-effect on prices in each period j as Ej, the model dynamics imply Ej=βT j + [(1+β1)Ej-1 - 
βT j-1] , where βT j  is the coefficient of the dummy Tj pertaining to the same period and β1 is the coefficient on 
the lagged price level p(t-1).     17
three alternative set of assumptions, namely that the introduction of the euro determined i) a 
simultaneous revision of all prices; ii) a temporary increase in market power; iii) both.  
A key assumption is that the introduction of a new currency increases the difficulty 
faced by the consumer in evaluating the relative price of the goods he or she is purchasing. 
Such a lack of price visibility, similar to what happens when engaging in transactions in a 
foreign currency,  has the effect of enabling producers to increase their selling prices the 
more, the greater is their market power.  
We consider a firm i producing a good with a constant unit cost of production, defined 
as Wi, under monopolistic competition, facing a demand curve  ) , ( k i i P P D D =  , where Pi is 
firm i's price and  Pk is the price set by the firm's competitors (which firm i takes as given); 
price elasticity is constant,  1 > ε . We omit the firm suffix in what follows. The first order 
condition from profit maximization ( WD DP
P
− max ) yields the price: 
() P W P ≡ − + = ) 1 ( 1 1 ε . We define the quantity demanded at this equilibrium price   
) (P D D = ; we assume that before the cash changeover the market clears, with the firm  
producing and selling D at price P. 
The consumer is confused by the cash changeover. This means that the firm can 
increase the price without the consumer noticing. More precisely, we assume that the 
consumer is presented with a new price P
€, not necessarily corresponding to the previous 
one. We assume that the probability that the consumer notices that the price has been 
changed is γ. If the consumer realizes that the price has changed, he just follows its demand 
curve. If he does not realize it, he keeps demanding the previous quantity D.  
In this framework, the problem of the firm is: 
(3)   D W P D W P
P ) )( 1 ( ) ( max − − + − γ γ  
The F.O.C. s  are: 
(4)     0 ) ( ) 1 ( =
∂
∂
− + − +
P
D
W P D D γ γ γ ,    18













W P , where the new (lower) 
demand elasticity is γhε; h is a positive term not larger than 1, increasing in γ.
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Equation (5) shows that after the changeover the price is unchanged if γ=1 (trivially, in 
this case there is no incentive to move the price since the consumer is on the original demand 
curve with probability 1)
26 or if ε→∞ (perfect competition). The inflation induced by the 
euro-changeover is larger, the larger is the firm's market power (small ε) and, obviously, the 
larger the probability that the consumer does not perceive the price change (small γ).  
The interpretation of the result is intuitive. The consumer's "confusion" caused by the 
cash changeover, captured by the variable γ, decreases the demand elasticity expected by the 
firm; the decrease is proportional to the original demand elasticity, ε. In the problem (3)  
faced by the firm, the marginal benefit of a higher price is the increase in the unit value of 
the old quantity sold, D; the marginal disadvantage depends on the probability that the 
consumer realizes that the price has changed and on the consequent decrease in sales, which 
is function of the elasticity ε (in this case the consumer follows the demand curve D(P)) . 
To capture the high observed degree of price stickyness, the model needs to be cast in 
a dynamic setting that accounts for costly price adjustment.  We follow Dotsey, King and 
Wolman (1999) and assume that firms incur a random menu cost ξt if their price is revised. 
The decision that in period t the firm will not revise its price thus depends on the comparison 
between the adjustment cost and the increase in profits that would be obtained by changing 
                                                           













h γ γ . Using a linear approximation of the demand function, it may be shown that 
in equilibrium it is 
ε γ γ ε γ
ε γ ε γ
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
− − −
− − −
= h . From S.O.C.s one gets  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − − − ε γ ε γ . hence 0<h<1. 
Condition γh>1/ε is necessary to have an internal solution. 
26 Note that if γ=1, then h=1.    19
the price. Marginal costs and the demand curve D(Pt) are assumed to be the same for all 
firms, so we omit the firm suffix in our notation, but introduce time suffixes. We define αt|t-j 
as the probability that in period t a price originally set in period t-j is left unchanged; as in 
Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), the probability depends on the distribution in the menu 
cost: firms balance the gains from adjusting the price with the menu cost (see Appendix B). 
Firms must take into account the effect of the current price on future periods' profits, in 
case they will not revise the price again. The solution of the optimisation problem is derived 
in Appendix B. From the first order conditions, the optimally reset price in each period is 
equal to the present discounted value of future marginal costs divided by the present 
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+ ∏ ≡ α ,  ϕt  is the (possibly time varying) price 
derivative of the demand function (normalised, without loss of generality, as a ratio to a 
steady state value),  εt is the (possibly time varying) demand elasticity and Xt is the general 
(whole economy) price level.
27  The sector's aggregate  price level Pt is obtained as a 
weighted average  of vintages of past prices P*t 's, where the share of vintage h prices in 
period t, is a function of the αi|j's.  
As assumed above, in t0 with probability (1-γ) consumers keep demanding the 
benchmark quantity D(Pt0), wherePt0 is the price that would have prevailed without the 
changeover. Considering expected demand   ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 0 0 0 t t t P D P D D γ γ − + = ,  ϕ t0 and εt0  in (7) can 
be derived.
28 
                                                           
27 If εt=ε , (7) can be shown to be consistent with the result of Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999). If αt|k=α, 
ϕt=1, εt=ε , the standard result of Calvo (1983) obtains. 

















ε γ εγ ε . This expression can be 
solved simultaneously with (7) to derive εt0  and Pt0.     20
We calibrate (7) assuming the annual discount factor is β=0.96 and, based on the 
features of our sample in 1999, that the steady state marginal cost Wt grows at a constant 
annual rate of 4 percent.  Using a relatively standard assumption, demand elasticity is set at 
εt|t≠t0=11 and ϕt|t≠t0=1, which corresponds to an equilibrium markup of 10%. The path of αt|t-j 
is endogenously determined by positing a uniform distribution for adjustment costs, 
calibrated to reproduce the fact than on average about 60 percent of firms do not revise their 
price, as from our panel data.  
The probability  that the consumer does not notice that the price has changed is set at 
(1-γ)=0.3. This assumption matches the evidence of the European Commission's 
"eurobarometer"; according to this survey, at end 2003 36% of Italian consumers reckoned, 
in retrospective, that their attitude was "to buy more, because they did not realize how much 
they are spending" after the introduction of the euro.
29 
In the first scenario the changeover involves a simultaneous "forced" revision of most 
prices (the "menu cost" is nil for all firms). In the second we posit that the consumer is 
confused with probability 1-γ , which increases the firm’s degree of monopolistic power. In 
the third scenario both shocks occur. 
The results of the simulations are shown in the four panels of Figure 6, which include 
the rate of inflation, the size of the average price revision, the share of unrevised prices and 
the price level. In each panel, the solid line shows the responses to a "menu cost" shock, the 
dashed line the responses to a "market power" shock and the dotted line the responses to 
both shocks occurring simultaneously. All shocks are assumed to take place in t0. 
The menu-cost shock scenario causes an increase in inflation, reaching 12.9 percent in 
t0 (top-left panel). The increase mostly reflects the share of unrevised prices dropping to 
zero (bottom-left panel), thereby sustaining average inflation; in contrast, the average size of 
individual price revisions is only marginally larger than in steady-state (top-right panel). 
Before t0, inflation falls slightly: the agents incorporate less future expected marginal cost 
                                                           
29 European Commission "Eurobarometer", The euro, two years later, January 2004.    21
increases in their prices, knowing they will be soon resetting prices. Afterwards, the inflation 
rate gradually returns to its steady state value (4%) with small oscillations.
30  
In the second scenario, the "market power" shock has an impact on period-t0 inflation, 
which increases to 6.3 percent.
31 The increase in inflation is the result both of a temporary 
increase in margins and of an (endogenously) larger number of price revisions: the share of 
prices which stay fixed drops to 53 percent, as more firms find it convenient to sustain the 
adjustment cost to exploit the increase in market power. The third scenario involving both 
shocks yields an higher inflation in t0, around 15 percent.  
In all three cases, the deviation of the price level from its long-run trend is relatively 
short-lived (bottom-right panel). After temporarily rising above their steady state path, prices 
slow down and are back to baseline on the second year after the shock.  
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The decomposition of the price increase, along the lines described in Section 4, is quite 
different in the three cases (Table 9).  After the "menu cost" shock, the increase in inflation 
is almost entirely (92%) due to the large number of price revisions. After the "market power" 
                                                           
30 As discussed by Hobjin et al., 2004, these oscillation are typical of models which include a maximum lag 
beyond which all prices are adjusted.  
31 The size of this effect, however, is strongly dependent on the exact shape assumed for the menu cost 
distribution, and it would be greater under parametrisations which increase the degree of state-dependency of 
the adjustment.    22
shock, the contribution to the increase in inflation is more evenly split among the two 
components (74 and 26 percent, respectively). When both shocks hit the economy, the 
decomposition of inflation lies somewhere in between.
32  
How does the model compare to the facts described in the previous sections? The 
profile of inflation and its decomposition are consistent with the idea that the "menu cost" 
shock may have determined the bulk of the impact of the introduction of the euro, with the 
"market power" shock possibly playing a complementary role. The overall size of the 
increase in inflation observed in the sample is fully consistent with what would have been 
produced by a mere revision of all menus, given the relatively high degree of price stickiness 
on this market. It is possible, however, that an increase in market power reinforced the effect 
of the "menu cost" shock.  
According to the model the price level will gradually return to its steady-state path. 
Such a convergence takes the form of small price revisions and a relatively high share of 
sticky prices. This implication is qualitatively - albeit maybe not quantitatively - matched by 
the features observed in our sample in 2004; in that year, the average price revision and the 
number of firms adjusting prices are below their medium-run levels.  
7. Conclusions 
This paper analyzed a panel of restaurant prices to study price setting behavior at the 
firm level during the cash changeover. The unique database allows us to shed light on two 
controversial issues concerning the effects of the cash changeover: first, to document what 
happened to prices at the micro level, in the year of the changeover and in the neighbouring 
ones. This evidence is a first key step in understanding what caused the public perceptions to 
deviate so markedly from official inflation measures. Second, to begin a systematic analysis 
of the mechanisms that may have affected price setting during the cash changeover. 
On the first question, our results show that a sizeable average price increase took place 
in 2002 (about 9 per cent). This increase is slightly smaller than the one recorded by the 
                                                           
32 These percentages are rather robust to different assumptions and calibrations for the menu cost 
distribution.    23
industry in the previous year (about 10 per cent). The evidence suggests that such increases 
are related to rising demand and costs conditions; this should induce caution in attributing a 
large inflationary effect exclusively to the introduction of the euro banknotes.  
The evidence clearly dismisses the hypothesis that the euro changeover favored a 
“doubling of prices”.  Such a widespread perception might be ascribed to the substantial 
price increase which took place in this sector over a longer time period (between 1998 and 
2003 the average price of a meal increases by 40 per cent; in the 10 per cent of restaurants 
recording the largest increases the rise is 75 per cent). The changeover might have focussed 
the public attention on the price level, prompting the attribution of the whole increase to the 
introduction of the euro.  
On the second question, we found that both the “menu cost” and the “market power” 
hypotheses find support in the data. As to the former, the evidence shows that much of the 
aggregate price increase during the changeover results from a greater number of prices being 
revised, rather than from “large” individual price increases. This appears consistent with the 
idea that the new currency denomination made it “mandatory” for almost all firms to revise 
their prices in 2002. In normal years, a great proportion of restaurants do not adjust their 
price, probably due to the presence of small menu costs.  
We also found that market structure affected price dynamics after the changeover. In 
2002 and 2003 price increases were larger in the provinces which featured a smaller degree 
of competitiveness. 
Both the “menu cost” and the “market power” hypothesis imply only a temporary 
effect on the price level. As a consequence, one may conjecture that price increases will be 
gradually reabsorbed, although it is too early to have decisive evidence on the latter 
conjecture. So far, in 2003 and in 2004 both the average price increase and the number of 
price changes were relatively moderate.     24
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Source: European Commission, Eurostat. (1) Perceived inflation: based on surveys by ISAE 
and by the European Commission. Differences between the share of respondents reporting 
“strongly increased” or “moderately increased” prices and the share of respondents 
reporting  “stable” or “decreased”  prices (right axis). (2) HICP inflation: twelve-month 
growth rates 
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Figure 3 - Activity and demand in the sector "hotels & restaurants" 
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Source: Istat, UIC.    29
 
Figure 4 - Fresh food prices and ULC in the sector "hotels and restaurants" 
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Source: Eurostat, Istat. 
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Frequency distribution of price increases in each year. Range of percentage increases from -0.5 (-50%) to 
1,2 (+120%) (horizontal axis). The tick marks 0. Each bar includes a range of price increases from t to t+3,5 
percentage points. 
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Figure 6 – Model based effect of the changeover  
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Based on the model in section 6. 
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Appendix A: descriptive statistics 
 
Table A 1 - Sample size 
(number of observations) 
.                        
price price change







Total 17036 12278  
Source: authors' computation based on data from Il Gambero Rosso.    33
 
Table A 2 - Sample composition, by region 
(number of observation and percentages) 
region observations frequency
Italy:                   
distribution of all 
restaurants, 1999
Abruzzo 336 2.7% 2.9%
Basilicata 151 1.2% 0.7%
Calabria 269 2.2% 3.4%
Campania 574 4.7% 9.7%
Emilia Romagna 1022 8.3% 6.5%
Friuli Venezia Giulia 426 3.5% 3.1%
Lazio 1471 12.0% 9.5%
Liguria 621 5.1% 4.2%
Lombardia 1608 13.1% 13.6%
Marche 396 3.2% 3.0%
Molise 73 0.6% 0.7%
Piemonte 984 8.0% 7.3%
Puglia 530 4.3% 6.0%
Sardegna 307 2.5% 3.2%
Sicilia 600 4.9% 5.4%
Toscana 1240 10.1% 7.5%
Trentino Alto Adige 445 3.6% 2.6%
Umbria 271 2.2% 1.7%
Val d'Aosta 113 0.9% 0.3%
Veneto 841 6.8% 8.9%
North 6060 49.4% 46.4%
Center 3378 27.5% 21.2%
South & islands 2840 23.1% 31.9%
Total 12278 100.0% 100.0%  
Source: authors' computation based on data from Il Gambero Rosso and Chambers of Commerce. 
(*) Restaurants registered at the Chambers of Commerce in 1999 (source: Rapporto sul turismo italiano - X 
edizione).    34
 
Table. A 3 - Sample composition, by type 
(number of observations and percentages) 
 
.                                
region (a) restaurants     (b) others (a) / (a+b)
Abruzzo 218 118 64.9%
Basilicata 113 38 74.8%
Calabria 170 99 63.2%
Campania 323 251 56.3%
Emilia Romagna 703 319 68.8%
Friuli Venezia Giulia 325 101 76.3%
Lazio 846 625 57.5%
Liguria 442 179 71.2%
Lombardia 1208 400 75.1%
Marche 230 166 58.1%
Molise 27 46 37.0%
Piemonte 861 123 87.5%
Puglia 328 202 61.9%
Sardegna 218 89 71.0%
Sicilia 404 196 67.3%
Toscana 837 403 67.5%
Trentino Alto Adige 366 79 82.2%
Umbria 198 73 73.1%
Val d'Aosta 76 37 67.3%
Veneto 644 197 76.6%
North 4625 1435 76.3%
Center 2111 1267 62.5%
South & islands 1801 1039 63.4%
Total 8537 3741 69.5%  
Source: authors' computation based on data from Il Gambero Rosso.    35
 
 
Table A 4 - Sample representativeness 










In 1999 (a) / (b)
Abruzzo 52 1914 2.72%
Basilicata 27 476 5.67%
Calabria 48 2196 2.19%
Campania 101 6272 1.61%
Emilia Romagna 209 4203 4.97%
Friuli Venezia Giulia 70 1985 3.53%
Lazio 247 6157 4.01%
Liguria 103 2701 3.81%
Lombardia 302 8834 3.42%
Marche 72 1933 3.72%
Molise 14 437 3.20%
Piemonte 154 4764 3.23%
Puglia 92 3889 2.37%
Sardegna 57 2053 2.78%
Sicilia 129 3483 3.70%
Toscana 252 4851 5.19%
Trentino Alto Adige 84 1672 5.02%
Umbria 54 1100 4.91%
Val d'Aosta 21 206 10.19%
Veneto 151 5758 2.62%
North 1094 30123 3.63%
Center 625 14041 4.45%
South & islands 520 20720 2.51%
Italy 2239 64884 3.45%  
Source: authors' computation based on data from Il Gambero Rosso and Chambers of Commerce. 
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Table A 5 - Competitive pressure  







Emilia Romagna 0.63 0.44











Trentino Alto Adige 1.01 0.26
Umbria 0.71 0.55





Averages of ratios computed at the province level. (a) Number of establishments included in the guide over 
total population in the province (tens of thousands); (b) Number of establishments included in the guide over 
(days of tourist presence/12  +  local population) - see text. Source: Chambers of Commerce, Istat and authors' 
computation based on data from Il Gambero Rosso. 
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 Table A 6 - The price of a meal  
(euros) 
Restaurants  
mean min 1°quartile median 4°quartile max stand. dev. coeff. var.
1998 33.2 12.9 25.8 31.0 36.2 113.6 11.6 0.35
1999 34.3 12.9 25.8 31.0 38.7 129.1 12.4 0.36
2000 36.3 12.9 28.4 33.6 41.3 129.1 13.2 0.36
2001 39.3 15.5 31.0 36.2 43.9 147.2 14.8 0.38
2002 42.8 16.0 32.0 40.0 48.0 220.0 16.7 0.39
2003 45.5 20.0 35.0 40.0 50.0 220.0 17.6 0.39
2004 48.6 21.0 36.0 45.0 55.0 250.0 19.8 0.41
Others 
mean min 1°quartile median 4°quartile max stand. dev. coeff. var.
1998 19.5 7.8 15.5 18.1 23.2 72.3 5.6 0.29
1999 19.8 7.8 15.5 20.7 23.2 56.8 4.9 0.25
2000 20.6 7.8 18.1 20.7 23.2 49.1 4.6 0.22
2001 22.5 8.8 18.1 23.2 25.8 46.5 5.3 0.23
2002 24.7 9.0 20.0 25.0 28.0 75.0 6.1 0.25
2003 28.0 11.0 23.0 27.0 30.0 105.0 9.1 0.32
Source: authors' computation based on data from Il Gambero Rosso. 
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percentile max std. dev.
1999 4.8 -50.0 -6.7 0.0 25.0 100.0 10.8
2000 7.1 -33.3 0.0 0.0 30.8 120.1 12.3
2001 10.3 -36.8 0.0 9.1 33.3 100.1 12.7
2002 9.1 -27.1 -3.0 7.7 29.0 83.3 11.2
2003 5.5 -27.0 0.0 4.3 20.0 71.9 8.5






percentile max std. dev.
1999 3.3 -42.9 0.0 0.0 19.9 75.0 9.5
2000 5.8 -33.3 0.0 0.0 28.5 80.0 12.2
2001 10.8 -33.3 0.0 11.1 33.4 80.0 12.1
2002 9.8 -27.8 0.0 8.7 29.0 94.4 11.6
2003 6.4 -29.4 0.0 6.7 20.0 66.7 8.7
2004 3.6 -21.4 0.0 0.0 18.5 60.0 8.2
 
Source: authors' computation based on data from Il Gambero Rosso. 
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percentile max std. dev.
1999 3.9 -27.3 -7.1 0.0 23.1 100.0 10.2
2000 6.1 -33.3 0.0 0.0 27.8 75.0 11.1
2001 10.9 -30.0 0.0 10.0 33.3 87.5 12.0
2002 8.9 -26.8 -3.8 7.7 30.4 84.6 11.8
2003 5.9 -24.3 0.0 5.0 20.0 66.7 8.1






percentile max std. dev.
1999 5.9 -23.1 0.0 0.0 25.0 99.9 10.6
2000 8.6 -27.3 0.0 0.0 37.5 120.1 14.3
2001 11.2 -36.8 0.0 10.0 37.5 100.0 13.4
2002 9.2 -26.9 0.0 7.7 29.0 80.6 11.1
2003 5.3 -29.4 0.0 0.0 20.7 50.0 8.8






percentile max std. dev.
1999 3.5 -50.0 0.0 0.0 21.1 75.0 10.6
2000 5.8 -33.3 0.0 0.0 28.5 75.0 11.8
2001 8.8 -33.3 0.0 9.1 25.0 100.1 12.2
2002 10.2 -27.8 0.0 9.5 26.9 94.4 10.4
2003 5.9 -12.7 0.0 4.7 20.7 71.9 9.0
2004 3.1 -36.4 -7.1 0.0 19.4 46.9 8.3  
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Table A 9 - Restaurant prices in Italy: a comparison among datasets  
(annual percentage changes) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
GR guide
(our panel) 4.3 6.7 10.5 9.3 5.8 3.8
Michelin Red Guide
(Adriani et al., 2003) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.6 n.a.
HICP restaurant and cafes
( Hobjin et al., 2004) 1.9 3.1 3.6 5.0 3.7 3.5
Istat ristoranti, pizzerie,
pubblici esercizi 1.7 3.2 3.8 4.8 4.6 3.6
Source: authors' computation based on data from Il Gambero Rosso, Istat, Eurostat, Adriani et al. (2003).    41
Appendix B - Mathematical details on the model of Section 6 
 
The problem analyzed in this appendix is a small variation of Dotsey, King and 
Wolman (1999), which allows for a time-varying elasticity of demand.
33  
The value of the firm in period t if it adjusts the price to the new optimal level is 
defined as vt|j and it is:  
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where  Xt is the general price level, Wt  denotes the marginal cost, αt|j the period t 
(endogenous) probability of not revising a price which was set in period j, and Ξt+1|t is the 
present expected value of the adjustment costs to be sustained next period. The value of the 
firm in period t  if it maintains its price at the current level, P*t-j  (where  j  is the price 
"vintage") is given by: 
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There is a fixed distribution of menu costs, which we assume for simplicity to be 
uniform over the interval (0, 1/k). The marginal firm (i. e., the one indifferent about resetting 
the price) is the one for which the realized menu cost equates the gain in its value resulting 
from price adjustment (vt|t - vt|t-j); hence, the share of firms adjusting their price is given by 
the c.d.f. of the menu cost, evaluated at the point (vt| t- vt|t-j). 
(B3)      ) ( 1 | 1 1 | 1 | 1 j t t t t j t t v v k − + + + − + − = −α  
The expected adjustment cost next period is:  
(B4)     
2
| 1 1 | 1
/ ) 1 (
0
| 1 ) (
2
| 1
j t t t t t
k




− + + +
−
− + − = = Ξ ∫
+ α
 
Taking the derivative of (B3) and (B4):    42
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The dynamic program (B1) implies the condition: 
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Taking the derivative of (B2) and using (B5) and (B6): 
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Substituting (B8) into (B7) and iterating yields: 











































































* ε , yields the expression for the optimal reset 
price Pt*  (equation 7 in the main text). 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
33 We also assume consumers have access to complete markets so that the ratio of marginal utility affecting 
the stochastic discount factor in DKW is constant at 1.    43
Based on (B8), vt|t can be linearized in a neighbourhood of [Pt-j*, vt|t-j] to obtain an 
expression for the impact of a price revision on firm's value: 
(B10)      ) (
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where 
j t k t
i
k
j t i t A − + +
=
− + ∏ ≡ | 1
0
| α . Finally, the current price Pt is a weighted average of past P*t 's : 







h t h t t t P P ω  
where the share of vintage h prices in the total of period t prices, ωt|t-h , is recursively given 
by:  
(B12)       j t t j t t j t t − − − − = | 1 | | ω α ω  
The simulation follows these steps: i) a matrix of probabilities {αi|j} is assumed as an 
initial guess; ii) the path for Pt* is derived using (7); iii) the composition of firms by price 
vintage ωi,j is derived using (B12), given beginning-of-period values; iv) the path for Pt is 
derived, as a weighted average of past Pt*'s, using (B11); v) the increase in profits resulting 
from price adjustment is derived using (B10); vi) a new matrix {αi|j} is derived using (B3); 
the process is iterated until convergence.  
To avoid the curse of dimensionality, a steady state solution is first derived, assuming 
marginal cost grow at a constant rate and keeping constant ϕt and ε t through time (without 
loss of generality, ϕt can be normalised to 1). Subsequently, we introduce in period t0 the 
shocks discussed in the text. In the first simulation ("menu cost") we set αt0|t0-j=0 (for all j's);  
in the second simulation ("market power") we set ϕt0=γ and determine ε t0 according to the 
expression in footnote 28 above. In each simulation, we re-estimate the elements αt|t-j's in a 
sufficiently large neighbourhood of t0, i.e. for t∈(t0-c,t0+c),
34 while keeping the remaining 
elements in  {αi|j} at their steady state value. 
 
                                                           
34 We first try with c= 1 and then increase c until the estimates of αt|t-j are no longer affected. 